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ABSTRACT
Empirical studies of covered interest arbitrage suggest that the interest rate parity
condtion is not always met and thus arbitrage profit apportunities do exist. As an international
financial centre in the Asian Pacific region, the evidence on the validity of the relationship in the
Hong Kong foregin exchange market is overwhelming. Allowing for transaction costs, we
attempt to examine whether there exist unexploited profit opportunities in the Hong Kong
foreign exchange market under the Hong Kong linked exchange rate system.
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I

INTRODUCTION
Arbitrageurs who are not willing to assume exchange rate risks but still wish to take
advantage of interest rate differentials can move funds from place to place and through recourse
to the forward market. Thus, on the assumption of smooth and efficient global capital mobility,
the covered interest arbitrage activity will exploit any profit opportunities. The interest rate
parity will finally be achieved.
However, empirical studies of covered interest arbitrage suggest that the interest rate
parity condition is not always held. The relationship holds well between some countries and/or
during some periods of time. Thus arbitrage profit opportunities do exist from place to place
and/or from time to time. In consideration of the existence of transaction costs, political risk,
speculative sentiments and capital market imperfections, many studies analysed the underlying
factors that lead to the persisting deviations from the interest rate parity. Stoll (1968) believed
that persistent speculative sentiment over time could explain the deviations. Branson (1969)
and Frenkel & Levich (1975, 1977) asserted that deviations from the parity were caused by
transaction costs. Aliber (1973) believed that political risk was one of the key factors causing
the deviations. McCormick (1979) suggested that the deviations might be produced by capital
control. In Hong Kong, Mak (1983) examined the covered interest rate parity hypothesis under
the flexible exchange rate system, and found that the deviations might be due to persistent
speculative sentiment over time and the limited arbitrage funds.
Since the introduction of the linked exchange rate system in Hong Kong in October
1983, the Hong Kong dollar has been linked to a fixed parity (HK$7.8 per US$1). In theory,
the spot and forward rate of the HK$ against US$1 will be close to the parity. However,
speculation on the revaluation or devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar makes it deviate from the
parity. The maintenance of the parity partially relies upon the covered interest arbitrage between
the spot and the forward market. If there still exist persistent unexploited profit opportunities
between the spot market and the forward market, then obviously, the effect of the covered
interest arbitrage will not be as large and/or as influential as the Hong Kong government
expects it to be. In that case, some measures need to be implemented.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the covered interest arbitrage under the linked
exchange rate system, allowing for transaction costs. In section II, we briefly summarise the
Hong Kong linked exchange rate system. Section III dwells on the theorem of the covered
interest arbitrage with and without transaction costs, particularly with reference to US and HK
market. Section IV illustrates the daa. Section V presents the empirical findings. Lastly, the
conclusion is given in Section VI.

II

HONG KONG LINKED EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM
In the period of 82-83, in the shadow of a series of the political squabbles on the Hong
Kong’s future (1997 problem) between China and the United Kingdom, there were substantial
slumps in the trade-weigted exchange rate index of the Hong Kong dollar (about 17.3% drop in
September 1982 - August 1983, 7.4% decrease in a single month, September 1983).1 To
rescue and stabilise the exchange rate of the Hong Kong dollar, the Hong Kong Government in
October 1983 introduced the linked exchange rate system. Since them, the Hong Kong
currency has been pegged with the US dollar at the parity of HK$7.8/US$1.0.
The linked exchange rate regime in Hong Kong is quite special and different from the
traditional fixed exchange rate system which is mainly dependent on the central bank’s
intervention. Without any central bank in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Government relies on
the operation of a fund called exchange fund 2 to maintain the official parity (fixed rate) with
commercial banks. At the same time, a free foreign exchange market where there are no
restraints on private trading in foreign exchange is maintained. Any divergence of the free
market rate from the parity will attract banks and speculators to aribtrage and thus the linked
exchange rate is maintained. In other words, the maintenance of the linked parity relies mainly
upon arbitrage force undertaken by financial institutions in Hong Kong, especially the
commercial banks. In fact, this is one of the features of the Hong Kong linked exchange rate
system — the reliance upon the arbitrage from the private sector to maintain its stability, rather
1
2

These figures are calculated from the relevant index obtainable from the Hong Kong Monthly Digest of
Statistics, January 1984.
The Exchange Fund was established by the Currency Ordinance of 1935. The establishment of the
Exchange Fund was to ensure that every dollar of Hong Kong currency had been adequately backed. The
Exchange Fund is managed by the Monetary Affairs Branch under the direction of the Financial
Secretary. The fund’s assets are held in bank deposits in Hong Kong dollars and in certain foreign
currencies, and in various interest-bearing instruments in foreign currencies.
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than dependence upon the official intervention like the case of fixed exchange rate system. In
theory, there exists the following feedback relation: the deviations of the market HK dollar rate
from the official parity will lead to arbitrrage activities which in return would reduce or
eliminate the devitions. Thus the market rate will remain around and close to the parity.
There are two types of arbitrage operations under the linked exchange rate system in
Hong Kong — Cash arbitrage and interest arbitrage.
The details of case arbitrage will not be discussed here .3 For interest arbitrage, the
Hong Kong Government, through the help of the Hong Kong Association of Banks ,4 can
artificially adjust HK dollar deposit rates in response to a large variation of the Hong Kong
dollar market exchange rate from the parity. This will also considerably affect the local
interbank markets, specifically the interbank liquidity.
Against the background of smooth and efficient global capital mobility, changes in HK
dollar interest rates, particularly interbank rates, relative to interest rates of other foreign
currencies can always generate large movements of profit-seeking funds between hong Kong
and foreign countries.

Ill

COVERED INTEREST ARBITRAGE
Against the background of smooth and efficient global capital mobility, arbitrageurs,
who are risk averse and do not want to face exchange rate risks but still wish to take advantage
of interest rate differentials can move funds from one country to another by selling the foreign
currency proceeds from the investment.
(a)

Covered Interest Arbitrage With No Transaction Cost
Assuming there exist no transaction costs, an arbitrageur borrowing in Hong Kong and
simultaneously investing in the US for n periods will result in profits if

For details, please refer to [4],
The Hong Kong Association of Banks was established in January, 1981. All banks in Hong Kong
should join as members. The Assocition sets the maximum rates of interest payable on deposits with
licensed banks and has the statutory obligation to consult the government on these interest rates.

where:

S =
F =
us
r
HK

n

Spot rate
Forward rate
US dollar interest rate
HK dollar interest rate
Maturity period of forward conract on a yearly basis.

The reverse activity, borrowing in the U.S.A. and simultaneously investing in Hong
Kong will be profitable if the reverse inequality holds. As long as either inequality holds, it
pays to borrow in one market and invest in the other because the investment proceeds are more
than enought to cover the loan.
The interest arbitrage will continue until there no longer exist any profit opportunities
between the Hong Kong and the US market. The following interest parity will finally be
achieved.

(2)

_S US$

J

In reality, transaction costs do exist and the covered interest arbitrage will be affected.
Transaction costs are brokerage fees on securities purchased and / or sales, and information
costs for small investors, thus cause the net yields of doing the arbitrage to be lower. For
covered interest arbitrage to occur, the net yield must be greater so as to cover the transaction
costs involved .5
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For details, refer to M. Levi (1983), pp: 163-181.
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The transaction costs for covered interest arbitrage include the brokerage costs of
buying and selling spot and forward foreign exchanges and commission costs of interbank
borrowing and lending HK dollars and US dollars. As at February 1, 1990, the standard costs
charged by brokerage firms in Hong Kong are shown in Table 1 (see Appendix).
Admittedly, direct dealings between traders may save brokerage commission fees and
may avoid any time lag due to liaison between brokerage firms and traders. This is especially
true when the dealing amount is very substantial. However, as an intermediary, a broker has
wide relationship with many traders. It can gather more efficient market infomation for buyers
and sellers. Consequently, rates quoted by the brokers usually more genuinely reflect the
market prices. Therefore, even though a buyer or seller needs to pay commission fees to a
broker, they still prefer to have indirect dealings through the broker as this may eliminate
searching costs.

(b)

Covered Interest Arbitrage with Transaction Costs
For covered interest arbitrage with transaction costs and for simplicity, we assume that
an arbitrageur, say, a commercial bank in Hong Kong, faces two investment alternatives: (1)
borrowing in HK$ and investing in US$ money market and (2) borrowing in US$ and
investing in HK$ money market.
By taking the transaction costs and the number of days within investment duration
periods into consideration, the interest parity relation becomes:
Case I: Borrowing HK$ Fund and Lending US$ Fund
An arbitrageur who borrows HK$ fund and lends US$ fund will have covered interest
advantage whenever
{[R (H K O )i + c l ] * 5 ^ 5 } - {[R (U S B )i + c 2 ] * J^ q I

< f (Fhi - M j) ] ,

_(Ss + cs) - 1 .

(2)
where i =1, 3 and 6 months
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R(HKO)
R<USB)
ci
C2
cs
Mi
Nj
Ss
Fbi

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

KH$ offered interbank rate for months i
US$ bid interbank rate for months i
HK$ borrowing commission fees
US$ lending commission fees
Spot transaction commission fees
Forward transaction commission fees for months i
No. of days to delivery date for months i
Spot selling rate of US$ versus HK$ (HK$/US$)
Forward buying rate of US$ versus HK$ (HK$/US$) for months i

That is to say, borrowing in Hong Kong and simultaneously investing in US will result
in a profit if the number of HK dollars received from the US investment exceeds the repayment
on the Hong Kong loan.
Case I I : Borrowing US$ Funds and Lending HK$ funds.
An arbitrageur who borrows US$ funds and lends HK$ funds will have covered
interest advantage whenever

[R(HKB)i - c3 ] * ^ 5 } - |[R(USO)i + c4 ] * ^ q
[1 + [R(USO)i + c4l*

N'

350

(F.si - Mj)

_(Sb + cs) - 1 _
(3)

where R(hkb ) = KH$ offered interbank rate for months i
R(USO) = US$ offered interbank rate for months i
C3 = HK$ lending commission fees
C4 = US$ borrowing commission fees
Sb = Spot buying rate of US$ versus HK$ (HK$/US$)
Fsi = Forward selling rate of US$ versus HK$ (HK$/US$) for months i
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In other words, borrowing in the US and similtaneously investing in Honk Kong will
result in a profit because the number of US dollars recieved from the HK investment exceeds
the repayment on the US loan.
In fact, the left hand side of inequalities (2) and (3) are the interest differential between
the Hong Kong and US market adjusted for the transaction cost, while that of the right hand
side are forward premium/discount between the Hong Kong and US dollar, also adjusted for
the transaction costs.
For convenience, we will use the following symbols to denote the above two
inequalities.
EDii = Interest Differential as stated in inequality (2)
(left-hand side of the inequality)
ED2i = Interest Differential as stated in inequality (3)
(left-hand side of the inequality)
FPii = Forward premium/discount as stated in inequality (2)
(right-hand side of the inequality)
F ? 2i = Forward premium/discount as stated in inequality (3)
(right-hand side of the inequality)

To summarise, unexploited profit opportunities exist between the Hong Kong and US
market whenever the interest differential is smaller than the forward premium/discount in those
two markets, i.e.
ID n < FPii

Inequality (2)

The unexploited profit opportunity would enduce borrowing HK$ funds and lending
US$ funds. This would have the following effects. The borrowing of HK$ funds to profit from
the arbitrage opportunity will put upward pressure on HK$ interest rates. If the borrowing is

8
through selling securities, this would reduce their prices and raise r^K- Since interest arbitrage
requires the spot sale of the Hong Kong dollars for US dollars. This will help bid up for the
spot price of the US dollar. That is, Ss will increase. Then the US dollars that are purchased
will be invested in a US security. If there are enough extra buyers, the price of the security will
increase, and the yield will decrease. That is, will fall. Lastly covering the funds moved to
US, which involves the forward sale of US dollars, will lower Ft,,. We can observe that all
these steps of the arbitage will work together and the movement is back toward the interest
parity line.
Similarly, when the interest differential in Hong Kong and the US market is larger than
the forward premium/discount in those two markets, that is,
i\ js

ID 2i > FP 2i

Inequality (3)

Interest arbitrageurs will wish to borrow in the US money market and invest in the Hong Kong
market. As before, there will be borrowing in the US and hence an increase in rus; spot
purchases of Hong Kong dollars, which will lower Sb; investment in Hong Kong, which lower
rHK; and forward sales of Hong Kong dollars, which will raise Fsj. Again all these steps
works simultaneously and the movement is back towards the parity line.
The arbitrage will stop when every
IDn > FPii and ID 2i < F2iThere exist no unexploited opportunities because allowing for the transaction costs, the
number of US/HK dollars received from the UK/US investment cannot cover the repayment on
the US/HK loan.
To see whether there exist persistent unexploited profits, we examine inequalities (2)
and (3) by plotting the relation between interest differentials and forward premium/discount.
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IV

DATA
This paper confines an analysis to the period of January 1990 to April 1990. During this
period, Hong Kong financial markets were not subjected to any speculative pressure. Daily
spot and forward US$ rates (versus HK$) as well as interbank rates for HK and US dollars
with respect to maturity of 1, 3 and 6 months were recorded simultaneously during the time
period between 10:45 and 11:15 a.m 6 of each reference day. Rates quotation of these were
obtained from Tokyo Forex & Tullett and Hua Chiao Commercial Bank Limited.
V

EM PIR IC A L FINDINGS
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the interest parity diagrams for one month to maturity under
case I and II situations. Since ID n > F P n, allowing for transaction costs, the loss in interest
differential is greater than the gain in forward premium. There exsists no profit incentive to
borrow HK$ funds and lend US$ funds. Meanwhile, ID 21 < FP 2 1 , the gain in interest
differential is less than the loss in forward premium. There exists no profit incentive to borrow
US$ funds and lend HK$ funds. In other words the forward exchange market for one-month
forward contract adjusts rapidly to the state of eqilibrium. No covered arbitrage advantage can
can be exploited.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the interest parity diagrams for three months to maturity
under case I and II situations. We find two inequalities : ID 13 > FPl 3 and ID 23 < FP 23. The
first inequality shows that as arbitrageurs borrow HK$ funds and lend US$ funds, the loss in
interest differential is greater than the gain in forward premium. There exsists no profit
incentive to abritage. Meanwhile, the second inequality shows that as arbitageurs borrows US$
funds and lend HK$ funds the gain in interest differential is less than the loss in forward
premium. There also exsists no arbitrage incentive. No covered arbitrage advantage can be
exploited.
Similarly, from Figure 5 and Figure 6, we find two inequalities for six months to
maturity : ID 16 > FP 16 and ID26 < F?26- As arbitrageurs borrow HK$ funds and lend US$
During this time period, trading transactions are most active and the spread of rates may acutally reflect
the real demand and supply situation and foreign exchange at that particular moment.
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funds, the loss in interest differential is greater than the gain in forward premium. There exsists
no profit incentive to arbitrage. Meanwhile, as arbitrageurs borrow US$ funds and lend HK$
funds the gain in interest differential is less than the loss in forward premium. Therefore, no
covered arbitrage can be exploited.
Table 2 summarises all the findings and implications. They unanimously show that
investors do not conduct covered arbitrage operations because there exists no exploited profit
opportunities during the study period.

VI

CONCLUSIONS
Empirical studies of covered interest arbitrage suggest that the interest rate parity
condition is not always held and it holds well between some countries and/or during some
periods of time. Arbitrage profit opportunities do exsist from place to place and from time to
time. In this paper, allowing for transaction costs, we have found that there exsists no
persistant unexploited profit opportunities between the spot market and the forward market in
Hong Kong during the study period. In other words, during this period, the spot and forward
rates of the Hong Kong dollar were not subject to any speculative pressure.
In this paper, it has been shown that interest rate differentials still take a significant part
in explaining in relation between forward and spot exchange rates in the case of US$ and HK$.
Since the maintenance of the linked parity partially relies upon the covered interest arbitage
between the spot and forward market. Based on the findings on this paper, the Hong Kong
Government can reinforce the covered interest arbitage through carefull manipulation of Hong
Kong dollar interest rates with a view to maintaining the linked rate.
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APPENDIX
Table 1

Transaction Costs in Covered Interest Artibtrage

Types o f Transactions
Spot FX
Forward FX
HK$ Interbank Market
US$ Interbank Market

Com m ission Fees
1 Month
3 Month
6 Month
Lending
Borrowing
Lending
Borrowing

HK$175 per million US$
HK$160 per million US$
FLK$200 per million US$
HK$200 per million US$
NIL
0.025% p.a. on transaction amount
for duration of borrowing period
calculated at 365 days basis
0.025% p.a. on transaction amount
for duration of lending period
calculated at 360 days basis
0.025% p.a. on transaction amount
for duration of borrowing period
calculated at 360 days basis
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Table 2

Findings & Implications of Interest Parity Diagrams

F igure

R e su lt

Im plication

Figure 1
Figure 2

ID n > FPn
ID2i < FP2i

No Arbitrage

Figure 3
Figure 4

ID13 > FPn
ID 23 < FP 23

Figure 5
Figure 6

ID 16 > f p 16
ID 26 < FP 26

No Arbitrage
No Arbitrage
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